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I. INTRODUCTION
Six miles north of the Montana border in southeastern British
Columbia, Cabin Creek enters the North Fork of the Flathead River. The
junction of these two streams is remote and largely inaccessible. South
from Cabin Creek across the international border the North Fork follows
the western boundary of Glacier National Park before joining the Middle
and South Forks. This is one of the wildest areas remaining in the lower
forty-eight states. The mountain ranges and valley bottoms provide habitat
for moose, elk, bighorn sheep, black and grizzly bears, and wolves.1 Further
downstream is Flathead Lake, the largest freshwater lake west of the
Mississippi. The Flathead region is nationally known for its scenery,
hunting, fishing, and recreation.
Near where Cabin Creek enters the North Fork are two small hills
under which lie an estimated 150 million tons of coal.2 Sage Creek Ltd.
plans to transform these hills into twin, mile- wide open pit coal mines.' The
company's plans have created enormous concern among Flathead Valley
residents, state officials, and federal authorities, who believe that the
region's environmental quality will be threatened by the coal mine. Fears
are that silt and pollution will flow downstream from the mine into the
I. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, FINAL REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE FOR
THE FLATHEAD RIVER BASIN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STUDY (June 30, 1983) (hereinafter cited as
FRBEIS FINAL REPORT) 39.
2. Id. at 10.
3. Id.
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Flathead Basin; that wildlife, especially the Dolly Varden trout, grizzly
bear, and wolf, will be endangered; and that water, air, and noise pollution
from the mine will adversely affect Glacier National Park, an Interna-
tional Biosphere Reserve."
The greatest concern, though, is that the proposed mines will be in
British Columbia, beyond the reach of the environmental laws of the
United States. For that reason, the Cabin Creek controversy is not simply a
regional drainage basin problem with its resolution dependent on local
decisions made in Helena, but rather an international problem whose
resolution may also depend on decisions in Victoria, Ottawa, and Washing-
ton. Any chance of preventing the construction of the mine or of mitigating
its possible adverse effects lies at the very least in direct discussion between
Montana and British Columbia, and more probably in international law of
pollution control.
Cabin Creek is not an isolated example of pollution along the United
States-Canadian border. There is a good reason for this. While the
population of much of the northern United States is small, 80% of the
Canadian population resides close to the border.5 At Cabin Creek,
Canadian development threatens an area in the United States renowned
for its remoteness and wilderness values. Similar situations occur further
east: north of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area in Minnesota, construc-
tion of a Canadian power plant is under consideration; and a Canadian
dam threatens wetlands along Lake Champlain in New York and
Vermont.' Closer to Cabin Creek, a power plant in Saskatchewan may
harm agricultural and irrigation values in eastern Montana.¢
The situation is not that simple, of course. Transboundary pollution is a
double-edged sword. In many places American pollution or water develop-
ment projects impinge on Canadian wilderness and recreation areas. The
issue of acid rain from industries in the United States damaging vast areas
of the Canadian interior has created much bitterness in Canada, and
threatens the close diplomatic ties between the two countries.8
However, unlike most nations sharing boundaries, Canada and the
United States have at least one mechanism available for resolving
4. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Toxic Substances and Environmental Oversight of the
Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 181 (July 6, 1983)
(hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Hearing) (statement of Jon Heberling, Attorney for Flathead
Coalition).
5. J. CARROLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: AN EXAMINATION AND A PERSPECTIVE OF
CANADIAN-U.S. TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS, XVII (1983).
6. Id. at 18, 105.
7. International Joint Commission, The International Poplar River Water Quality Study, Main
Report (1979) 1.
8. CARROLL, supra note 6, at 270.
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transboundary pollution disputes. In 1909, the two nations signed the
Boundary Waters Treaty which created the International Joint Commis-
sion (IJC), to resolve boundary water disputes, including those involving
pollution.'
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the Cabin Creek dispute
from both a regional and an international perspective. The history of the
mine proposal and institutional responses to date will first be discussed.
Then the work of the International Joint Commission will be evaluated to
determine if a resolution to the controversy can be found in international
law. Because so much concern has been expressed before the beginning of
construction, the situation provides a unique opportunity for state, provin-
cial, and national governments to implement an effective means of
resolving not only this dispute, but also a growing number of similar
disputes along the border. For these reasons, the environmental and legal
issues of Cabin Creek deserve close attention. This is more so the case
because British Columbia approved Sage Creek Ltd.'s Stage II application
to build the mine on February 22, 1984.10 The company now needs only to
gain provincial approval for its operating licenses before construction of
the mine can begin.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISSUE
The Flathead Basin consists of 7096 square miles of land, six percent
of it in Canada, much of it publicly owned.11 It is an area rich in natural
resources. The North Fork Valley, although still relatively wild, is
becoming a center of resource development. Recently, oil and gas explora-
tion has skyrocketed,' 2 and timber harvesting, long the area's primary
industry, has increased. 13 The North Fork region also contains coal. The
existence of coal in the upper North Fork Valley has been known since
1910, but not until the 1960's were any attempts made to extract it.'4 In
1968, Rio Algom Ltd., a division of Britain's Rio Tinto Zinc, entered into a
joint venture with Pan Ocean Oil Ltd. of Calgary, to explore the feasibility
of coal development in southeastern British Columbia.' After securing a
license from British Columbia, and obtaining 51 leases covering 24,652
9. The Boundary Waters Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S.
No. 548.
10. Schwennesen, Cabin Creek Mine Gets Key Approval, Missoulian, Feb. 23, 1984, at 11, col.
I.
11. R. Stevers, The Flathead Issue in U.S.-Canada Environmental Relations: Institutional
Responses in Montana, (1981) 12 (unpublished Masters Thesis, University of New Hampshire).
12. FRBEIS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 37.
13. Id. at 37, 39.
14. Id. at 11.
15. L. Hocklin, Cabin Creek Realities, Montana Public Affairs, Rep. No. 22, June 1977, 1, 2.
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acres, 16 the corporation, Sage Creek, spent seven years exploring, eventu-
ally concentrating its efforts at the junction of Cabin Creek and the North
Fork. 17
The public first learned of the proposal to mine the coal in 1974.18
Concern quickly developed among Flathead Valley residents over the
effects that the mine would have on their region. In late 1974, several
Flathead Valley organizations formed the Flathead Coalition.19 The
Coalition sought to make the public aware of the mine, and pressed for a
study of its effects. 0 Soon, the State of Montana and members of
Montana's congressional delegation became involved. Early attempts by
Representative, (now Senator), Max Baucus to bring the matter before the
IJC through the State Department met with resistance because the
Department did not believe the company's proposal had developed to the
point where the United States could raise specific objections.2 1 At the same
time, the Montana State Legislature directed the Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation to review water resource information from
the Flathead system and assess the consequences of a mine upon the area.2 3
Lack of scientific data sufficient to make any.meaningful projection of the
mine's effects hampered this review.2
The desire for more natural resource data and the concerns about the
coal mine led to a call for an overall assessment of resource development,
present and proposed, in the Flathead Basin.2 Urged on by the Flathead
Coalition and the North Fork Interagency Technical Committee, Repre-
sentative Baucus successfully lobbied Congress in 1977 to appropriate 2.9
million dollars for an overview environmental impact statement of the
Flathead Basin.25 The Flathead River Basin Environmental Impact Study,
(FRBEIS), a five-year interdisciplinary study of the Flathead sponsored
by the Environmental Protection Agency, was the first regional environ-
mental impact statement to examine all development proposals within a
drainage basin at one time.26 Its creation was largely a response to the
16. Stevers, supra note 11, at 12.
17. Hocklin, supra note 15, at 2. The coal at Cabin Creek is purported to be seven times as
valuable per ton as coal from the northern plains.
18. Burke, Coal Mine Poses Threat to Flathead Valley, Missoulian, Feb. 12, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
19. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 4, at 178 (statement of Jon Heberling). Organizations
represented included the Sierra Club, The Montana Wilderness Assoc., the Lions Club, the League of
Women Voters, and local Chambers of Commerce.
20. Id. at 178 (statement of Jon Heberling).
21. Hocklin, supra note 15, at 3.
22. FREis FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 12.
26. Id.
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perceived threats to the region posed by Sage Creek's plans.
Implicit in the concept of this study was the feeling that if the United
States showed concern for development proposals on its side of the border,
concerns in the Flathead over possible pollution originating in British
Columbia would have more credibility. As the study would show, though
Cabin Creek was the gravest threat, oil and gas leasing, hydroelectric
generation, timber harvesting, and increased population also posed threats
to the Flathead.27 Obviously, developments such as these in Montana
would weaken the United States' request that British Columbia reject the
mine proposal.2"
Meanwhile, Sage Creek was attempting to comply with British
Columbia's environmental regulations in order to begin construction of the
mine. In Canada, the provinces, which are much more independent from
the national government than the states in the United States, have almost
exclusive control over the development of resources on public land.2 9 In
British Columbia, coal development is controlled by guidelines established
by the Environment and Land Use Committee of the British Columbia
Cabinet.30 The aim of the guidelines is to ensure that a "rational approach
to managing land use, environmental, and community impacts is under-
taken prior to final decisions on coal and related development."3" The
guidelines include a five step project assessment process coordinated by a
Coal Steering Committee. 2 The first step, the Prospectus, entails a general
description of the proposed development by the developer. Stage I is a
preliminary impact assessment which must be approved by appropriate
provincial departments. Stage II is the most crucial, involving a detailed
assessment of the project, the British Columbia equivalent of an environ-
mental impact statement. In Stage III, the project is given a final analysis
and granted licenses if accepted. Stage IV is the formal implementation of
the project.33
27. Stevers, supra note 11, at 3, 4.
28. For the same reason, Rep. Baucus pressed for the inclusion of the three forks of the Flathead
in the Wild and Scenic River System. Additional efforts in Montana at this time included the passage of
a state law allowing Montanans to sue Canadian polluters in Montana. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 69-
3906(4), -4802(10) (1977). See Arbitlit, The Plight of American Citizens Injured by Transboundary
River Pollution, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339 (1979). Arbitlit discusses three possible remedies for United
States' citizens affected by Canadian pollution from Cabin Creek: by direct use of the courts of the two
nations; through provisions of the Boundary Water Treaty; and through use of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. Of the three, the last provides the best possibility for collecting damages.
29. Hocklin, supra note 15, at 8.
30. Environment and Land Use Committee, British Columbia, Guidelines for Coal Develop-
ment (1976).
31. Id. at 1.
32. Id. at 2.
33. Id. at 9.
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In July of 1975, Sage Creek submitted its Prospectus. 4 The Stage I
application was presented in July 1976, and approved that October.36 The
Stage II Assessment, completed in late 1979, was rejected in early 1980."
One reason given for the rejection was that the assessment had not
adequately addressed the company's plans to reroute a small stream
around the northernmost hill of the project in order to accommodate a
waste dump."' British Columbia officials were concerned with the effect
that such a diversion would have downstream. This concern had been
previously expressed to the British Columbia government by Montana
officials. 8
After the initial Stage II application was rejected, the threat of
imminent development of the mine abated. Sage Creek seemed in no rush
to submit a new Stage II application. The market for coal was, and
remains, soft.39 Nonetheless, the prospect of a mine at Cabin Creek
involves potentially huge revenues for Sage Creek as well as British
Columbia. Thus, it was no surprise that Sage Creek re-submitted a revised
Stage II application. The Coal Guidelines Steering Committee accepted
this application for review in February of 1982.40
Sage Creek's current proposal involves two open pit mines, each 1000
feet deep, to be dug directly north and south of Cabin Creek near its
confluence with the North Fork.41 A total of eight square miles of land will
be disturbed by the mines and the proposed waste dumps to be built
adjacent to the mines along Cabin Creek and Howell Creek.42 Other
developments at the mine site will include tailing ponds, run-off ponds, a
processing plant, a coal drier, and a temporary townsite.'
Because British Columbia recognized Montana's continued concern
over the mine, it invited the state to submit official comments on the second
Stage II application. These comments, included in the official provincial
review, represent the first time that Montana has been given an opportu-
nity to comment on a major Canadian development." Working with a
34. Stevers, supra note 11, at 23.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 29.
39. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 4, at 181 (statement of Jon Heberling).
40. Schwennesen, Cabin Creek Coal Mine Bid Hits Second Level, Missoulian, Feb. 18,1982, at
7, col. 4.
41. FRBEIs FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 165.
42. Id.
43. Id. Originally, the company proposed a permanent community of one thousand workers at
the mine site, but that idea was eliminated in 1982.
44. Letter from Montana Governor Ted Schwinden to British Columbia Premier, William
Bennett (May 13, 1982).
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short deadline and drawing primarily from data gathered during four years
of research by the Flathead River Basin Study Commission, state officials
submitted a one-hundred page report highly critical of the mine proposal
(Montana Comments)." 5
Using state and federal environmental regulations for coal mines as
guidelines, the Montana Comments addressed five major concerns about
potential environmental harm to the Flathead Basin. First, emissions of
particulate matter from the coal drier at the site would exceed both state
and federal air quality standards." Additionally, the state estimated that
about eight trucks an hour would use the haul road to Fernie, causing dust
that would increase air pollution and reduce visibility in Glacier National
Park.47
Second, the Montana Comments reflected concerns about the effect
the mine would have upon water resources and aquatic ecology, including
possible impacts upon Flathead Lake." Connected with this concern with
water quality, state officials predicted that the mine would have an adverse
effect on fisheries, the third major area of harm. Fishing is a mainstay of the
tourist industry in the Flathead Valley, 49 and the proposed mine will harm
one of the major spawning grounds for the Dolly Varden, the most prized of
the native fish.50
The mine also threatens the continued livelihood of remnant wolf and
grizzly populations. Both of these animals are protected in the United
States under the Endangered Species Act. 51 The grizzly population just
south of the boundary near the mine site is the most concentrated in the
lower forty-eight, and the bear is generally considered to be a major symbol
of the wilderness character of the area. Because both animals are quite
common in other parts of British Columbia, the Stage II Assessment did
not adequately address the mine's impact on their populations in that
area. 2 Montana officials expressed fear that operation of the mine would
lead to the biological "insularization" of Glacier Park, threatening its role
as a World Biosphere Reserve.53
Finally, the Montana Comments were critical of the company's
failure to include an adequate reclamation plan. The one in the assessment
45. State of Montana Comments on Sage Creek Coal Company's Stage 11 Assessment (May 13,
1982) (hereinafter cited as Montana Comments).
46. Id. at III.
47. Id. at V-3.
48. Id. at 11-0.
49. FRBEIS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 47, 135.
50. Montana Comments, supra note 47, at vi.
51. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1974).
52. Montana Comments, supra note 47, at viii.
53. Id. at V-4.
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was considered "unspecific and extremely poor" by Montana standards.54
Brian Smith of the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum
Resources responded to the Montana Comments on September 27, 1982,
in a letter to Montana Governor Schwinden. 55 Smith acknowledged that
Montana did raise some issues not addressed in the company's assessment,
but explained that many of those concerns would be addressed in the Stage
III Assessment at which time specific requirements of the British Colum-
bia environmental regulatory agencies would have to be met.56
The Stage II application has been accepted by British Columbia. Sage
Creek now has five years to secure operating licenses in the Stage III
process and to find buyers for the coal.57 Due to the pressure from Montana
and the State Department though, British Columbia took the unusual step
of conditioning its approval of the mine.58 The conditions are a response to
Montana's concerns and include requirements that Sage Creek complete
in-depth studies of the fisheries and wildlife of the area.59 Additionally,
Provincial approval was made conditional on actions taken by the Cana-
dian Government pursuant to Boundary Waters Treaty obligations.60
Nevertheless, Senator Baucus, contending that modifications to the
project's design are necessary to protect Montana's water quality,"' asked
the State Department to refer the matter to the International Joint
Commission. 2 He requested that a two-year study be undertaken which
will presumably be completed before coal markets improve and construc-
tion begins.6s The Canadian government has previously indicated that it
will join with the United States in making a referral to the IJC.64
III. THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION AND CABIN CREEK
A. The Purpose and Powers of the IJC
Because it is now probable that any joint solution to the Cabin Creek
conflict will be reached under the terms of the Boundary Waters Treaty,
54. Id. at VI-1.
55. Letter from British Columbia Minister of Energy, Mines, and Petroleum Reserves, Brian
Smith, to Montana Governor Ted Schwinden, accompanying the British Columbia Response to the
Montana Comments (Sept. 27, 1982).
56. Id.
57. Supra note 10.
58. Id.
59. Letter from Anthony Brummett, Chairman, British Columbia Environment and Land Use
Committee, to L.H. Hunter, President of Sage Creek Coal, Ltd. (Feb. 22, 1984).
60. Id.
61. Missoulian, supra note 10.
62. Telephone interview with Ron Cooper, Aide to Senator Max Baucus (Feb. 21, 1984).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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the remainder of this Comment will focus on the treaty and the IJC and
their effectiveness in resolving pollution disputes.
Great Britain and the United States negotiated the Boundary Waters
Treaty in 1909 to resolve water disputes along the boundary between
Canada and the United States. 5 It was designed to remedy any trans-
boundary water dispute, although most of the initiative behind the treaty
was to regulate uses of water that required "bilateral action. '6 6 Examples
of early issues addressed were the establishment of the Saint Lawrence
Seaway, irrigation disputes, and hydroelectric projects involving both
governments.67
The treaty created the International Joint Commission which has six
members, three from each nation, appointed by the President and Prime
Minister.68 It is a quasi-judicial body which has mandatory jurisdiction to
approve or disapprove projects such as diversions or obstructions affecting
boundary waters. 69 In this area, Commission decisions are binding on both
nations. But, the Commission also is given broad authority to investigate
other matters referred to it.70 When disputes arise, either or both nations
may make a "reference" to the Commission, requesting an investigation.
In practice, references have always been made by agreement of both.7 1 The
investigative findings are usually put together into a recommendation
outlining what action should be taken to alleviate the boundary dispute.
These recommendations are non binding and have been adhered to in
varying degrees, as will be examined below. 2
Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty specifically deals with
pollution: "It is further agreed that the waters herein defined as boundary
waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on
either side to the injury of health or property on the other. '7 3
This provision is very unusual considering the date of the treaty,
1909-fifty years before pollution became a major issue. However, the fact
that neither "pollution" nor "injury" was defined in the treaty has left the
meaning of Article IV in question.74
Additionally, the effectiveness of the treaty was further weakened by
65. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 9.
66. CARROLL, supra note 5, at 40.
67. Id. at 47.
68 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 9, Art. VIII, at 2451.
69. CARROLL, supra note 5, at 47.
70. Id.
71. FRBEIS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 40.
72. CARROLL, supra note 5, at 47.
73. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 9, Art. IV, at 2450.
74. Bilder, Controlling Great Lakes Pollution: A Study in U.S.-Canadian Environmental
Cooperation, 70 MIcH. L. REV. 469, 515 (1972).
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the inclusion of the Harmon Doctrine in Article II.7 That doctrine was
formulated in 1895 by Attorney General Judson Harmon to deal with
apportionment of waters flowing out of the United States into Mexico. It
states that nations have exclusive jurisdiction and control over the uses of
all waters within their boundaries.7 6 The strongly nationalistic terms of the
doctrine are only slightly tempered by subsequent language in Article II
stating that a downstream user injured by an upstream user is entitled to
the same rights and remedies that he would have if the injury had occurred
in the source nation." Realistically, this "right" to legal recourse in the
source nation is almost completely hampered by the difficulty of filing suit
and enforcing damages in a foreign country.78
Despite the uncertainty about the meaning of certain sections of the
treaty and the amount of power it vests in the IJC, it has through the years
been an effective mechanism in resolving transboundary pollution dis-
putes. The second reference to the newly formed IJC concerned the
"extent, causes, and locality" of boundary water pollution.79 Other early
references involved specific pollution controversies, and most of the recent
referrals to the Commission have also involved pollution. Examination of
the work of the IJC in recent years sheds light on how the Cabin Creek
reference might be treated.
B. Case Studies
1. Garrison Diversion
The most famous-and infamous-recent transboundary water qual-
ity issue is the proposed Garrison Diversion Unit (GDU), along the North
Dakota-Manitoba border. The GDU is a proposal to divert water from the
Missouri River to irrigate 250,000 acres of North Dakota land, and to
provide municipal, industrial, and recreational water supplies.80 Much of
the water diverted would flow, once used, into the Hudson Bay drainage in
Manitoba. Manitobans feared that the mixing of waters from the Missouri
with those draining north would have an adverse impact in Canada. 1 In
1975, the two governments referred the matter of the transboundary
75. Botindary Waters Treaty, supra note 9, Art. II, at 2449.
76. CARROLL, supra note 5, at 43.
77. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 9, Art. II, at 2449.
78. See generally, Arbitlit, supra note 30.
79. Bourne, International Law and Pollution of International Rivers and Lakes, 6 UNIv.
B.C.L. REv. 115, 133 (1971).
80. International Joint Commission, Transboundary Implications of the Garrison Diversion
(1977) 1.
81. Kaufman, U.S. &Canada Agree to Study Dam Project, New YorkTimes, Nov. 28. 1983, at
A12, col. 1.
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implications of the Garrison project to the IJC.82
In 1977, the IJC issued a strongly worded report recommending that
no portions of the GDU affecting Canadian waters be built until certain
conditions were met.8" The Commission implied that if the United States
did not meet the conditions the Boundary Waters Treaty would be violated.
Although clearly following the Treaty in recommending against pollution
from a transboundary project, the strong stance taken by the IJC has led to
disputes among diplomats, who believe it has exceeded its mandate. There
are fears that its scope of investigation may, as a consequence, be limited in
future matters.84
The politically controversial Garrison project is presently moving
ahead, but only on a limited basis. Its proponents claim that the first phase
will not affect the Canadian river systems, and is consistent with the IJC
recommendations.85 But, both the Canadian government and concerned
groups in the United States fear that, although the project is limited now,
there is still a good chance of biota transfer from one drainage causing
pollution in another.8" In late 1983, Canada and the United States
established a commission, made up of representatives of both national
governments, North Dakota and Manitoba to study Canadian concerns.8 7
This commission is independent of the IJC, which has not been involved in
the dispute since 1977, but its purpose seems to reflect the earlier IJC
recommendations.
The IJC's Garrison recommendations set a precedent against devel-
opment projects producing extensive pollution across the border. The fact
that such a recommendation was made could in itself have a positive effect
upon a Cabin Creek reference. If these recommendations are adhered to,
the United States' position in any Cabin Creek negotiations would be
further strengthened.
2. Poplar River
A less encouraging result was reached in 1979 when the IJC issued its
findings on the Poplar River controversy. 88 That dispute grew out of
Saskatchewan Power Corporation's 1973 proposal to build a 600 mega-
watt coal-fired generating plant near Cornach, Saskatchewan, north of
82. Transboundary Implications of the Garrison Diversion, supra note 82, at 1.
83. Id. at 4.
84. CARROLL, supra note 5, at 128.
85. Telephone interview with Ed Brigham, National Audobon Society, Minneapolis (Feb. 17,
1984).
86. Id.
87. Supra note 81.
88. International Joint Commission, International Poplar River Water Quality Study, Main
Report (1979) (hereinafter cited as IPRWQS Main Report).
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Poplar, Montana.8 9 The pollutants from the plant would flow downstream
into Montana.9"
Two references were made to the IJC, one on water quality, the other
on water apportionment. 91 The major point to come out of the Water
Quality Study's Main Report was the implication that some downstream
pollution is acceptable across the international border.92 This finding,
reflecting the Harmon Doctrine, seems at odds with the recommendations
made in the Garrison Diversion reference, and may reflect the reaction to
the strong wording of that finding. Another disturbing element in the
Poplar River dispute is the fact that the power plant was in operation and
discharging pollutants for half a year before the final IJC Report was
issued.93 Both of these factors could reduce the effectiveness that an IJC
reference would ultimately have on Cabin Creek.
Despite these problems, the IJC work on the Poplar River dispute did
have a positive result. A Bilateral Poplar River Monitoring Commission set
up by the IJC continually monitors air and water quality and water
apportionment, and exchanges data between the two nations. The commis-
sion is composed of members from state, provincial, and federal govern-
ments.94 The creation of ongoing commissions to follow up on IJC
recommendations and to monitor pollution has been used in the past in
other referenced matters, and has given the IJC long term, indirect
influence over border controversies.
3. High Ross Dam
Another recent IJC decision on a boundary waters matter, the High
Ross Dam controversy, demonstrates the effectiveness of ongoing study,
and may well set an example for Cabin Creek. High Ross does not
directly concern pollution. Instead, it involves flooding into British Colum-
bia caused by the Ross Dam in Washington.96 However, it is similar to
Cabin Creek because the flooding of the Skagit River has affected a remote
wilderness area in British Columbia known for its recreational values.7
89. Id. at vii. See also CARROLL, supra note 5, at 184.
90. CARROLL, supra note 5, at 174.
91. Id. at 184.
92. IPRWQS Main Report, supra note 90, at 115.
93. CARROLL, supra note 5, at 193.
94. Id.
95. International Joint Commission, Supplementary Order, In the Matter of the Application of
the City of Seattle for Authority to Raise the Water Level of the Skagit River Approximately 130 feet
at the International Boundary Between the United States and Canada (April 28, 1982) (hereinafter
cited as Supplementary Order).
96. CARROLL, supra note 5, at 96.
97. Parker, High Ross Dan: The IJC Takes a Hard Look at the Environmental Consequences
of Hydroelectric Generation-The 1982 Supplementary Order, 58 WASH. L. REv. 445, 446 (1983).
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In 1927, Seattle City Light (Seattle) began constructing a series of
hydroelectric dams. 8 This project culminated in Ross Dam, creating Ross
Lake, Seattle's primary storage facility for hydropower.99 In 1941, Seattle
requested a permit from the IJC to raise the level of Ross Dam, an action
that would have flooded 6300 acres of Canadian land. 100 Under Article
VIII of the Treaty, the IJC was given mandatory jurisdiction over all cases
of obstruction and diversion of boundary waters.' 0 ' This article also gives
the IJC power to request indemnification of damaged parties. In 1947, the
IJC granted Seattle's request on the condition that the province and the
city reach a binding agreement on indemnification.0 2 Since then the dam
has been raised a number of times, although never to the level requested in
1941. The city and the province have been at constant odds over the method
of indemnification. 0 3 In 1980 British Columbia, reacting to Seattle's
continued interest in raising the level of the dam, put the matter before the
IJC for resolution.'0
In April of 1982, the IJC issued a Supplementary Order. 10 5 Although
the Commission rejected British Columbia's specific requests, it found that
under "the Commission's responsibility to prevent disputes .. . the
Canadian Skagit should not be flooded beyond its current level."' x
However, the Commission required British Columbia to compensate
Seattle "in the form of money, energy, or any other means," for the loss of
the hydroelectric resource.107 After ordering Seattle to maintain the level
of the dam for one year, the Commission created a Special Board
comprised of two IJC members and one each from the United States,
Canada, British Columbia, and Seattle, to reach an agreement acceptable
to all parties.0 8 During the following year, Seattle and British Columbia
signed a "Framework Agreement" implementing the IJC's recommenda-
tion not to raise the dam.'09 The Agreement outlined a compensation plan
for British Columbia to supply Seattle with the amount of hydropower that
Seattle lost in not being able to raise the dam. Seattle will pay British
98. Id. Seattle City Light is Seattle's municipal lighting authority.
99. CARROLL, supra note 5, at 96.
100. Parker, supra note 99, at 451.
101. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 9, Art. VIII, at 2451.
102. Parker, supra note 99, at 451.
103. Id. at 452, 453.
104. Id.
105. Supplementary Order, supra note 97.
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Skagit Negotiations, Framework Agreement Between Canada and the United States (Feb.
3, 1983).
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Columbia for that power for the next eighty years.110 One important
feature of the Framework is the environmental endowment fund created to
finance the maintenance of recreational facilities in the Ross Lake/Skagit
Valley."" The IJC's work on the Skagit issue is significant for three
reasons. First, although organized by the IJC, the final decision was
essentially worked out locally between British Columbia and Seattle. This
method could be followed at Cabin Creek, especially because the local
governments are familiar with the environmental problems and with each
other. Second, the IJC Order and Framework Agreement implicitly
recognized environmental values in the decision not to raise the level of the
dam, and explicitly recognized them in the creation of an environmental
endowment fund, Third, the IJC seemed to reject the Harmon Doctrine,
which gives each state absolute rights to waters on its side of the border, in
favor of a more equitable apportionment.11
C. Effect on Cabin Creek of Recent IJC Decisions
As previously mentioned, Senator Baucus has asked the State
Department to draft a request for a two year IJC study of Cabin Creek.
What can be accomplished by an IJC Cabin Creek reference will depend
upon what the Commission's recommendations are and, more importantly,
whether they are adhered to by the two governments. It must be
remembered that IJC decisions are not binding in these matters, as has
been demonstrated by the continuing controversy over the Garrison
Diversion. Recommendations have, however, generally been followed.
Recently, one commentator stated that "the evolving body of decisions by
the IJC presents a clearly definable principle of international law."11
Those "definable principles" have expanded with the recent decisions
noted above. A strong recommendation against the pollution of Cabin
Creek would strengthen the precedent against substantial transboundary
pollution.
It is apparent that in almost every controversy where the IJC has
stepped in, concessions have been made by both sides. That will certainly
110. Id. at 2.
111. Id. at 11.
112. Parker, supra note 99, at 449. The Harmon Doctrine of unlimited sovereignty has been
superceded in international law by the doctrine of equitable utilization. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of
Waters of International Rivers, Aug. 20, 1966 (Adopted by the 52nd Conference of the International
Law Assoc.) Reprinted in J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUT1N
(1974) 77. Under the Helsinki Rules, each state is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and
equitable share in the beneficial use of the waters of an international drainage basin. Helsinki Rules,
Article VI.
113. Sugarman, The IJC and Principles of International Law, in ABA/CBA COMMON
BOUNDARY/COMMON PROBLEMS: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY PRODUCTION
48 (1981).
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be the case at Cabin Creek. It is those very concessions that have enabled
the IJC to remain a viable referee in boundary disputes at times when the
two nations could have been left without any problem resolving body.
Furthermore, concessions made as a result of IJC study of a problem are
not made with a single drainage, lake, or river in mind.
One reason that the IJC works well... [is that there] is not one
river; it is a whole series of them, and there is always the
knowledge that you had better be generous this time because next
time, the shoe may be on the other foot, and you might be
downstream instead of upstream." 4
Thus, addressing development at Cabin Creek, there is reason to
believe that an IJC decision there will be favorable to Montana and the
Flathead Valley. Granted, the Poplar River decision allowing some
pollution downstream does not bode well for Montana's interest in keeping
the Flathead pristine. If the Stage III Assessment is accepted and the plant
granted licenses, if coal markets improve, and if construction begins, it is
doubtful that the IJC could stop the project and prevent all downstream
pollution. On the positive side, though, if the Garrison Project as currently
proposed has only a limited effect on Canadian waters, and if the Skagit
Framework Agreement is successful, (there is every indication that it will
be), it means that there will have been two recent concessions to the
Canadians by the United States on river disputes. Significantly, one of
those concessions involved British Columbia.11 5
The Skagit River decision, with its provisions for compensation, was
based on the indemnification provision in Article VIII of the treaty."16
Although that provision does not apply to pollution, the creation of an
environmental endowment fund in the Skagit Framework Agreement set a
precedent that could be read to broaden the meaning of the provision. One
of the greatest concerns in the Flathead Valley is whether Sage Creek
would be held to compensate for any pollution damage to valley property.
Given the probability that the mine will be constructed, it is possible that
the IJC, following its work on the Skagit, could request that the two
countries initiate a study of property and recreational values in the
Flathead, and set up an indemnification program before the mine
114. Henry, Transboundary Pollution and the IJC, in ABA/CBA COMMON BOUNDARIES/
COMMON PROBLEMS: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY PRODUCTION, 49 (1981).
115. As noted earlier, Canadian provinces are largely independent from the national govern-
ment on resource matters. For that reason any attempts to link the conflict in British Columbia with
other conflicts along the border would probably have little influence on the British Columbia
government. It is interesting to note that acid rain has not even been raised by British Columbia as a
parallel issue. Telephone interview with Ron Cooper, Aide to Sen. Max Baucus (March 16, 1983).
Thus, the existence of a recent concession to British Columbia is particularly important.
116. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 9, Art. VIII, at 2451.
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commences.
Another important aspect of the Skagit Agreement is that the Seattle
and British Columbia governments were given the ultimate decision
making power. Montana has kept pressure on British Columbia, and the
concessions that have been made are the result of that more so than any
federal pressure. It would make sense at Cabin Creek, as at Ross Lake, to
give the primary decision making to the local governments, leaving the IJC
to oversee the process and ensure that the link between Cabin Creek and
other transboundary disputes is recognized.
At Cabin Creek the IJC has the opportunity to increase its effective-
ness in resolving transboundary pollution disputes. By following and
expanding upon past IJC decisions, the Commission can set a strong
precedent in determining how much, if any, pollution will be tolerated
across the border. Additionally, a strong stand on indemnification of
injured parties and a recognition of the necessary role of the local, state,
and provincial governments in the fact finding and decisionmaking will
reaffirm earlier IJC recommendations. The effect of a comprehensive
study at Cabin Creek culminating in a clearly defined recommendation
against pollution will be to enhance the credibility of the IJC as a dispute
resolving body. A strong line of recommendations, up to and including one
at Cabin Creek could eventually result in more pressure being put on the
two nations to adhere to IJC findings.
D. Consideration of a Stronger IJC
Some have argued that the IJC is not as effective as it could be, and
should be given broader power in resolving pollution disputes.11 7 While the
IJC should be able to effectively resolve the Cabin Creek dispute, if it does
not, or if British Columbia refuses to follow its findings, then consideration
of a stronger mechanism may be in order. The Boundary Water Treaty
gave the IJC mandatory jurisdiction over all water diversions along the
boundary.1 Emerging trends in international pollution law may provide
the basis for an expansion of that mandatory jurisdiction into the area of
pollution control.119 With mandatory jurisdiction, the IJC would automat-
ically be called in to investigate possible impacts from any construction
along the border. This expansion of the IJC's power would require a special
117. Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 4, at 174 (statement by James Cumming).
118. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 9, Art. IV, at 2450.
119. Tied to the doctrine of equitable utilization in the Helsinki Rules is the assertion that
nations must prevent all water uses producing "substantial injury" to the neighboring state, if such use
does not fall within the state's equitable utilization of its water. Helsinki Rules supra note 114.
Although not officially endorsed by either Canada or the United States, the Helsinki Rules summarize
generally accepted principles df inteinational law. See generally Arbitlit, supra note 30, at 360-67.
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agreement between Canada and the United States.120
Mandatory jurisdiction could have advantages over the present issue
by issue treatment by the IJC. First, it would ensure that environmental
impacts would be studied and evaluated before construction begins,
avoiding situations like that which occurred at Poplar River. Second, a
known set of environmental standards would necessarily be applied
whenever a pollution problem arose. Despite these advantages, mandatory
jurisdiction would be difficult to initiate and could also create problems.
The two nations have been reluctant to alter the terms of the Treaty in the
past. "' Also, mandatory jurisdiction would take the flexibility out of the
current dispute resolution process. In situations where the local govern-
ments may be able to resolve a problem among themselves, automatic
referral to the international body could alienate the parties and make it
more difficult to arrive at an equitable solution. Weighing this alternative
against the present mechanism it appears more advantageous to both
countries, at this point, to leave the IJC structure as it is. Once the IJC has
built up some "case law," local and national governments can attempt to
adhere to its standards prior to making a reference.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Cabin Creek controversy is a classic example of the problem of
transboundary pollution: most of the benefits accrue to one side, while most
of the damage goes to the other. 22 It is probable that the mine will be
built-there is too much high grade coal at Cabin Creek to be ignored. The
challenge lies in how well Montana, British Columbia, and the two
national governments can work together to ensure that if a mine is built,
each party's environmental and economic concerns are addressed. To date,
the cooperation has been greater than in most previous transboundary
disputes. This creates the possibility that the dispute can be resolved
through informal channels. There are some Montana officials who prefer
that the negotiations be kept informal, in light of the concessions already
made by British Columbia. 23
But, it is likely that the IJC will play a role in resolving the dispute.
The greater challenge lies in whether the two nations will allow the IJC to
become a more effective means of resolving not only the Cabin Creek
controversy, but all other transboundary pollution disputes. Because Sage
Creek has not yet begun construction of the Cabin Creek mine, the IJC will
120. Telephone interview with Frank Bevaqua, IJC (Mar. 16, 1984).
121. Id.
122. Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 4, at 178 (statement of Jon Heberling).
123. Telephone interview with Mike Pichette, Aide to Montana Governor Ted Schwinden (Feb.
24. 1984).
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have an excellent opportunity to complete a thorough study of the impacts
of transboundary pollution and to make recommendations which will serve
as standards to be followed in resolving future disputes along the boundary.
If the IJC fails to adequately resolve the Cabin. Creek dispute, then
consideration of mechanisms for strengthening the body may be in order.
